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POST-MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING
Malcolm A. Moore
Knowledge of post-mortem estate planning has always been necessary for
any advisor working in the trusts and estates area. In one respect, post-
mortem estate planning is more satisfying than general estate planning
because one is dealing with a fixed set of facts (when the client has died) and
it is up to the post-mortem planner to be as creative as possible in saving
income, gift and estate taxes within a given set of parameters. In the general
estate planning area all possibilities must be considered and that can be frus-
trating, as well as challenging. With the removal from the transfer tax system
of a large number of estates when the 1981 tax legislation was passed
expanding the unified credit and introducing the unlimited marital deduction,
post-mortem estate planning will become an increasingly significant part of
every estate lawyer's practice. Even those estates which no longer generate
any estate tax are still prime candidates for effective post-mortem estate plan-
ning; significant reduction of income taxes during estate administration for
such estates is still possible.
My focus in discussing post-mortem estate planning in this paper is on
those aspects of post-mortem planning which are relatively new; some of
these possibilities have come about through recent legislation and others are
refinements on old techniques given recent legislative, case law, and ruling
developments. The traditional post mortem planning techniques of using the
estate as a separate tax paying entity, with the selection of a fiscal year, etc.,
while not highlighted in the paper, are discussed at its end.
I. Elections Available To Executor.
Alternate Valuation Election.
The Deficit-Reduction Act of 1984 (the "1984 Act") permits the election
of the alternate valuation for estate tax purposes only if the election would
result in (a) a reduction in value of the decedent's gross estate and (b) a
smaller estate tax liability. Hence the election of a higher alternate value in a
"4no tax" situation (for example, by reason of the unlimited marital deduc-
tion) will not be allowed. The provision applies to estates of decedents dying
after July 18, 1984. The Act also allows an alternate valuation election to be
claimed on a late-filed estate tax return, but the return cannot be filed more
than one year after the time prescribed by law (including extensions) for
filing.
The prohibition against using the alternate valuation date in a zero tax
estate is potentially disastrous when the will or revocable trust contains a
pecuniary maximum marital deduction bequest (either outright or in trust)
with the residue constituting the credit shelter and the estate has substantially
depreciated during the six-month period. In such a situation, all of the
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decrease in value will be allocated to the residue (credit shelter disposition)
and none to the marital share, and the residue could be eliminated or reduced
substantially. For example, if an estate was worth $6,000,000 at death, but
declined by $600,000 in the first six months, and no alternate valuation date
could be elected, the entire $600,000 reduction in value will reduce the
exemption equivalent disposition to zero.
If some tax was payable, but would be reduced by use of the alternate
valuation date, the alternate valuation date could be used. Hence, a partial
QTIP election to pay some tax might seem sensible. However, if the decedent
resided in a state whose estate tax is the amount of the federal state death tax
credit, the entire death tax credit amount must be paid to the state. Presuma-
bly an executor would not want to incur payment of the entire state death tax
credit merely to make the alternate valuation election available. However, in
a jurisdiction which does not define its death tax in terms of the federal
credit, paying a small amount of federal tax to enable use of the alternate
valuation election should be explored.
"Discretionary" Valuations. Even if the alternate valuation date cannot be
used (as in a no-tax situation) there is usually some latitude given an executor
to opt for higher, as opposed to lower, valuations, when different to value
assets (such as closely held stock) are involved. This would be desirable if a
higher cost basis for income tax purposes could be achieved through the use
of the higher date of death values. Of course, consideration must be given to
I.R.C. § 6659 (providing for penalties for overvaluation of assets) which
apparently could be used by the IRS to impose §6659 penalties on a taxpayer
selling assets which had received too high a value (and hence basis) for estate
tax purposes. See f.n.1 of Joint Jommittee General Explanation of ERTA
(1900), p. 333.
If it is determined that there is latitude in valuation in a no-tax situation,
and that Section 6659 will not be applicable or troublesome, consideration
should be given to the following general principles:
1. In general, if no tax is payable at death of either spouse, choice of the
highest reasonable values upon the first death in order to achieve an increased
cost basis for capital gains, depreciation or cost depletion seems desirable.
2. If the credit shelter or exemption equivalent disposition is carved out by
way of a pecuniary bequest, with the residue passing to or for the spouse's
benefit, choice of higher values to achieve a greater income tax basis would
also seem prudent. The legacy would be funded with assets at their distribu-
tion date values, and anything in excess of that would pass to the marital
share. Regardless of the asset values, the credit shelter disposition receives
only the dollar amount of the exemption equivalent, and the balance passes
to the marital share.
3. If the instrument provides for a marital deduction pecuniary bequest,
with the residue passing to others or to a "family" trust, choice of higher
values could substantially increase the amount passing to the marital trust,
which in turn will be subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate. This is
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undesirable. Under pre-1982 law, only one-half of any such increase in value
was taxed at the surviving spouse's death (since the marital deduction at the
first death was limited to one-half of the estate), but a new cost basis was
achieved with respect to the entire additional value. After 1982, however, all
of such increase in value will be subject to tax at the surviving spouse's death,
because of the unlimited marital deduction. For example, assume an adjusted
gross estate (as computed under prior law) where the range of possible asset
values is between $1,800,000 and $2,100,000. The assets appreciate to
$2,600,000 on date of distribution. The surviving spouse has $600,000 of
separate assets and both deaths occur after 1987. If the lower value of
$1,800,000 is used, the spouse receives $1,200,000. If the higher value of
$2,100,000 is used, the spouse receives $1,500,000. This will mean that
potentially $300,000 more will be subject to future estate tax in the surviving
spouse's estate to achieve $300,000 of additional basis. The additional estate
tax at the surviving spouse's death will be $139,000, assuming no further
appreciation, versus a maximum capital gains tax saving of $60,000. Use of
the higher values would not be warranted.
Undervaluation Penalties.
The 1984 Tax Act added Section 6660 which provides a penalty in case of
asset undervaluation for gift and estate tax purposes. The presence of this
penalty will require greater care and caution than in the past when nonfraud-
ulent attempts to use low valuations only resulted in the additional tax and
interest if a higher value was ultimately sustained. The new Section provides
that if it is determined that the valuation claimed is 50% or more but not
more than 66-2/3% of the true value, there is a penalty equal to 10% of the
underpayment of tax; if the valuation is 40% or more but less than 50%, then
the penalty is 20% of the underpayment; and if the valuation is less than 40%
of the true value, then the penalty is 30% of the underpayment. There is a de
minimis exception for underpayments of less than $1,000 and the IRS may
waive all or any part of the addition to the tax on a showing by the taxpayer
that there was a "reasonable basis" for the valuation claimed on the return
and such claim was made in "good faith." It remains to be seen what it will
take to establish a "reasonable basis" for the reported value; presumably
appraisals should be of help, although no regulations have yet been issued.
The penalty would appear to apply even if the undervaluation is due to a
mistaken assumption that Section 2032A would apply. Does reliance on the
cases which have been favorable to the taxpayer in allowing for a minority
and nonmarketable discounts on closely held stock constitute "a reasonable
basis"? The answer should be "yes" but there is no guidance. The penalty
applies for taxes payable on returns filed after December 31, 1984.
Deduction of Administration Expenses.
If no estate tax is payable, because either a decedent's property falls below
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exemption equivalent or the unlimited marital deduction is being used, or
because of a combination of these, administration expenses such as executors'
and attorneys' fees which are deducted on the estate tax return will not
generate any tax savings, for the obvious reason that no estate tax is payable.
This would lead one to conclude that in every such case they should be
deducted on the estate's income tax return.
However, when such expenses, which are charged against principal, are
used for income tax purposes, as opposed to estate tax purposes, a "Warms"
type adjustment is often mandated, either by the governing instrument or by
state law. In re Warms Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1955);
In re Bixby's Estate, 295 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1956). The income account is obli-
gated to reimburse the principal account for the additional estate tax caused
by the failure to use the deduction against the estate tax. However, when
there is no estate tax, there has been no detriment to principal, and hence
there would appear to be no adjustment required under the Warms rationale.
However, there still could be an argument for some kind of equitable
adjustment. It could be argued that even if no estate tax is payable, had the
expenses been deducted on the estate tax return and not on the income tax
return, the nonmarital credit shelter disposition would not have been reduced
by the amount of such expenses and, therefore, more property could have
been excluded from the surviving spouse's estate. Foregoing an immediate
income tax deduction could result in a possible future tax reduction. In the
author's opinion, it is most unlikely that an executor (the spouse, child or a
third party) could be criticized for not opting for the more immediate tax
savings, even though it could arguably ultimately result in the diminution of
principal by payment of additional estate taxes at the second death. Given
this belief, the author also believes that no equitable adjustment should be
contemplated.
On the other hand, if the administration expenses would ultimately be
chargeable against the marital share (either because the unified credit had
been used up during life and no other source existed for their payment, or the
instrument's language did not require that administration expenses deducted
on the income tax return by payable from the nonmarital share) perhaps it
would be more prudent to deduct them for estate tax purposes, rather than
for income tax purposes, even though there appears to be no immediate
benefit. If they were deducted for income tax purposes, and taken out of the
marital share, estate tax would have been created where none was intended
because the marital deduction would be reduced.
If this happened, then arguably there would be a Warms-type equitable
adjustment payable from income in the amount of the estate taxes caused by
deducting administration expenses on the income tax return, as opposed to
the estate tax return.
Could it be argued, however, that if state law imposed a Warms-type
adjustment on the estate, that no taxes should be deemed payable from the
marital share in the first place, and hence there should be no estate tax? This
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theory has been suggested by some prominent commentators. Blattmachr &
Lustgarten, "The New Estate Tax Marital Deduction: Many Questions and
Some Answers," 121 Trusts & Estates No. 1, p. 18 (Jan. 1982). For this
theory to work, however, there would have to be an actual Warms adjust-
ment which reimbursed principal (and hence the marital share) for 100% of
the estate taxes paid. If income from the QTIP trust is used to make the
reimbursement (which under the Warms rationale would be the case), has theQTIP trust been disqualified because the spouse is no longer receiving all of
the income? The answer should be no, based on the argument that if state
law imposes a Warms adjustment, this by definition would reduce the income
in the QTIP trust and the surviving spouse would still be receiving, under
state law, all of the trust income. If there was a nonmarital trust disposition,
there should be no qualification problem if income is taken from the nonmar-
ital share to make the reimbursement. Usually, however, there will not be
sufficient income in the nonmarital share to fully adjust for such estate taxes,
and the QTIP or other marital disposition would have to be tapped.
The QTIP Election.
In General
In determining whether to make a full or partial QTIP election, the execu-
tor is first governed by the governing instrument's language. For example, the
Will may direct the executor to elect all qualifying property for QTIP treat-
ment. The Will might direct the election unless the surviving spouse did not
have a long life expectancy at the first spouse's death. The rationale for this
would be that a full election in the first decedent's estate would generate no
tax and none of the lower estate tax brackets would be utilized, whereas all
the property would be taxable in the surviving spouse's estate at higher
brackets.
If wide discretion is given the executor, the following factors are some
which should be considered:
1. Size of respective estates of husband and wife.
2. Age and physical condition of surviving spouse.
3. Source of death tax payments for nonelective share; if a partial election
is made which creates tax, the executor must know the source of that tax and
whether it will be paid by the same beneficiaries as ultimately receive the
QTIP trust remainder, or whether other beneficiaries will bear the burden.
4. Possibility of disclaimer by the surviving spouse which might preclude a
partial or full election by the executor.
5. Potential availability of a Section 2013 property previously taxed credit
to the surviving spouse's estate for a life estate subject to tax in the first estate;
this could be relevant to whether the partial QTIP election or disclaimer
route should be chosen.
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Mechanics of Making the Election.
Proposed Regulation § 20.2056(b)-7(b) states that the QTIP election shall
be made by the executor (as defined in Section 2203 and the Regulations)
who is "in possession of" the qualified terminable interest property and shall
be made by such executor on the estate tax return. The regulation goes on to
define the estate tax return as the last estate tax return filed by the executor
on or before the due date of the return, or if a timely return is not filed by the
executor, on the first estate return filed by the executor. Hence the election
can be made on a late filed estate tax return, which had been questionable
before the regulations were issued. However, the election, once made, is
irrevocable. Also, if the executor has made an election with respect to one or
more properties, then no subsequent election may be made with respect to
other properties in the executor's possession. The reference to property in the
possession of the executor would prevent an appointed executor from making
an election for property held by a trustee under a revocable trust because the
executor does not have "possession" of that property. The regulation should
make it clear that the executor can make the election for all property,
whether or not possessed by the executor.
Recent private letter rulings have held that no QTIP election is available if
an election is not made on the first return filed, although if the time for filing
a timely return is still open, presumably an amended return can be filed
claiming the election. Private Letter Rulings 8418005, 8427004, and
8427007. Neither of the returns as filed in the latter two rulings indicated in
any manner a desire to claim QTIP treatment. However, on both returns, the
property in question was listed on Schedule M as a deductible interest, but
with no further explanation. In one ruling there was no box on the return to
check, and in the other the box had been checked "no". The Rulings did not
disallow QTIP treatment solely because the appropriate box was not
checked; each ruling said that if there had been sufficient other indicia of
interest on the return to claim QTIP treatment, the marital deduction would
have been allowed.
Partial Elections.
Proposed Regulation § 20.2056(b)(7)(b) confirms the language of a pre-
viously issued temporary regulation that a partial election can be made relat-
ing to a fractional or percentile share of the property, and that it can be made
by means of a formula. The provision then goes on to state that if a partial
election is made, the trust may be divided into separate trusts to reflect a
partial election that has been made or is to be made. If such a division occurs,
the fiduciary must divide the trust according to the fair market value of the
trust assets at the time of the division. The creation of separate trusts is usu-
ally the most advantageous manner in which to effect a partial election. The
trustee can invest the two trusts differently, e.g., the elective trust could be
invested in income-producing assets and the non-elective trust could be
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invested in growth assets. Further, invasions could be made from the elective
trust before the non-elective trust was depleted by such invasions. It is also
clear that if separate trusts are not cleared, but a partial election is made with
respect to a portion of a QTIP trust, then principal invasions can be made
from the share for which a QTIP election has been made before invasions are
made from the other share. Proposed Regulation § 20.2044-1(d), and (2).
The examples in paragraph (e) illustrate that property included in the surviv-
ing spouse's estate when there has been a partial election is reduced by the
invasions made from the qualified share, even though no invasions have been
made from the nonqualified share.
Election for Dispositions Made Under
pre-September 11, 1981 Instruments.
If the disposition meets QTIP qualifications, an election is allowed. See,
e.q., Private Letter Rulings 8308053, 8309030, 8343020, 8440037 and
8420074. Assuming that all of the decedent's property would pass under
either a marital deduction formula clause or under an "old" trust for which
QTIP treatment was elected, or both, the exemption equivalent in the dece-
dent's estate could be saved and not wasted by a partial, not a full, election
by the executor of the decedent's estate for assets passing into the residuary
trust. Alternatively, there could be a partial formula-based disclaimer by the
surviving spouse of a portion of property passing under either the maximum
marital deduction clause or the residuary trust.
Allocation of Assets Between Marital and
Nonmarital Shares.
In general, growth assets should be allocated to the nonmarital share.
However, if there is only a choice between growth assets on the one hand,
and high yield assets on the other, a case can be made for allocating the
growth assets to the marital share, and the high yield assets to the nonmarital
share. At the surviving spouse's death the growth assets in the marital share
will receive a new cost basis, eliminating any capital gains tax. If it is
assumed that income received by the surviving spouse from the marital share
will be taxed at 50%, allocation of the high yield assets to the nonmarital
share would create the possibility that the income will be taxed in a lower
bracket, such as a child's. Of course, if the surviving spouse receives all of the
income from the nonmarital share, then this assumption is not accurate.
For a further discussion of allocation, see Eubank, "When the Estate Plan
Must Be Made Final: an Overview of Decisions and Techniques Shortly
After the Decedent's Death," 17th Miami Institute on Estate Planning
(1983).
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II. DISCLAIMERS
Post-1976 Transfers in General
Section 2518, enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, attempted
(but failed) to "federalize" the law regarding disclaimers. In order to be a
"qualified" disclaimer (so as to not be treated as a transfer by the disclaimant
for estate, gift, and income tax purposes) Section 2518 provides that the
disclaimer must be irrevocable and unqualified and must also have the fol-
lowing characteristics:
1. This disclaimer must be made within nine months after the day on
which the transfer creating the interest is made (which means, according to
the Congressional Committee Reports, a completed transfer for gift or estate
tax purposes), or, if the disclaimant is under age 21, he or she has until age
21, whichever is later, to make the disclaimer, § 2518(b)(2);
2. The disclaimant may not have accepted any of the interest or its benef-
its, § 2518(b)(3);
3. As a result of the disclaimer, the interest must, except in the case of a
spouse, pass to a person other than the person making the disclaimer, and
there cannot be any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer
with respect to the disposition of the disclaimed property. § 2518(b)(4).
The statute goes on to specify that disclaimers can be made of "undivided
portions" of an interest, § 2518(c)(1), and that a power with respect to prop-
erty is regarded as an interest in such property for purposes of a disclaimer. §
2518(c)(2).
Proposed § 2518 Regulations.
Proposed regulations under § 2518 dealing with disclaimers were filed on
July 21, 1980, and have not yet been made final. The following are the more
noteworthy provisions:
1. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-1(c) dealing with the effect of local law
confirms the position taken in several private rulings that if a disclaimer is not
made in a timely fashion under state disclaimer law, it will not qualify under
§ 2518.
2. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-2(c) dealing with the nine-month time
limit makes it clear that a person can disclaim upon attaining age 21 even
though the disclaimant has received benefits from the property "without any
action on his part but before attaining 21 years of age," such as a trustee
exercising discretionary powers to invade the trust for the minor's benefit.
Paragraph (c)(2) of that section also makes it clear that in the case of a
special power of appointment, the holder of the power, permissible appoin-
tees, or takers in default of appointment must disclaim within a nine-month
period after the creation of the power. This is obviously impractical, since in
the case of a "limited-unlimited" power of appointment exercisable in favor
of anyone except the decedent, his estate or creditors of his estate, anyone
else in the world is a permissible appointee.
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3. With respect to the condition of § 2518 that no disclaimant may have
accepted benefits in property attempted to be disclaimed, Proposed Regula-
tion § 25.2518-2(d) states that the payment of property taxes on property
subsequently disclaimed is an acceptance of the property, as is a request by
the disclaimant to a fiduciary to sell property and give the proceeds to the
disclaimant.
4. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-2(d)(3) dealing with joint ownership
specifies that any disclaimer of a joint tenancy must be made within nine
months of the creation of the tenancy; this is consistent with the holding of a
number of private letter rulings in the area.
5. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-2(e), dealing with how much power
can be retained by a disclaimant to direct beneficial enjoyment of the dis-
claimed property, provides that a power of appointment may be disclaimed if
there is no direction on the part of the disclaimant with respect to the transfer
of the property subject to the power. There have been some questions as to
whether a power could ever be disclaimed because such a disclaimed power
does not usually pass to someone other than the disclaimant, which is one of
the requirements of § 2518.
6. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-2(e)(2) dealing with disclaimers by sur-
viving spouses and the examples relating thereto, states that a disclaimer of a
portion of a marital deduction trust which passes to a nonmarital trust is a
qualified disclaimer so long as there is no special power of appointment pres-
ent. If there is such a special power present, the special power must also be
disclaimed. However, the disclaimer of such an interest into a nonmarital
trust where the surviving spouse can invade corpus for his or her "health or
maintenance" is allowed.
7. Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-3 deals with disclaimers of less than an
entire property interest. Paragraph (a)(1)(i) states that'an income interest
beneficially owned by a person shall be considered one interest and a benefi-
cial interest in corpus shall be another interest. Therefore, a beneficiary who
has a life interest and a remainder interest in the same trust can disclaim one,
and keep the other. However, this section also states that if the applicable
instrument divides the property in a manner that would permit the disclaim-
ant "to avoid the limitations of § 2518, the separate interests created by the
grantor are treated as one indivisable interest." An example of this is con-
tained in example (14) of paragraph (d) which recited the following fact
situation: D was to receive one-third of the residuary estate, with any dis-
claimed property passing to E; D was to receive a second one-third of the
residuary estate with any disclaimed property passing to F, and D was to
receive the final third of the residuary estate with any disclaimed property
passing to G. D disclaimed the first third of the residuary estate, but kept the
other two. The example states that this disclaimer is not a qualified one.
This section also specified that if state law merges separate interests (such
as remainder interests and income interests) transferred to a beneficiary, the
beneficiary must disclaim the entire interest, and may not keep the income or
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the principal interest, respectively. Example 13 of paragraph (d) involved the
factual situation where A received a life estate in a farm, and was sole recip-
ient of the residuary estate, which also received the remainder interest. Under
state law, the beneficiary's interests merged to give him a free simple in the
farm and all he disclaimed was the life estate. The example states that the
disclaimer does not qualify.
Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) states that a partial disclaimer may be made of severa-
ble property, which "can be separated from other property to which it is
joined and which, after severance, maintains a complete and independent
existence." There follows an example involving the disclaimer of some shares
of a corporate stock, with the acceptance of others, resulting in a qualified
disclaimer.
Paragraph (a)(2) deals with interests in trusts and states that a trust benefi-
ciary must disclaim all interest in principal, or all interest in income, to have
a qualified disclaimer. Thus, for example, a testamentary power of appoint-
ment over principal cannot be effectively disclaimed without disclaiming
rights to receive discretionary distributions of principal (example 11 of para-
graph (d)). A disclaimant can also not disclaim discretionary powers to pay
himself principal for "happiness," but retain the right to pay it for "health
and maintenance." Such a disclaimer would have been useful to convert an
otherwise general power of appointment to a limited, nontaxable power of
appointment.
In that same paragraph (a)(2), it is stated that income or remainder inter-
ests in particular trust assets may not be effectively disclaimed if interests in
income or principal in other trust assets are retained.
Paragraph (b) of the proposed section makes it clear that a beneficiary who
would otherwise have received a fee simple disposition may not "carve out"
and disclaim the remainder interest, while keeping the life estate. This is not a
disclaimer of "an undivided portion" which the paragraph states must consist
of a fraction or percentage of each and every substantial interest or right
owned by the disclaimant in such property and must extend over the entire
term of the disclaimant's interest in such property and in other property into
which such property is converted.
Private Letter Rulings on Partial Disclaimers.
Partial Disclaimers of Partial Interests.
Private Letter Ruling 8332014 held unqualified the disclaimer by a trust
beneficiary of the income from, and a general power of appointment over,
specific trust assets. The Ruling held that such a disclaimer did not constitute
the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest in property called for by
I.R.C. § 2518(b). Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-3(c)(5) was cited as author-
ity for this proposition.
In Private Letter Ruling 8406014, the IRS held that the disclaimer of indi-
vidual assets from an estate (as opposed to a trust) constituted a qualified
TAX CONFERENCE
disclaimer. The Ruling stated that although the items of the residue of the
estate are not initially identifiable, the residue, at the time of settlement and
distribution, consists of specific property items that are separate, complete
and of independent character. Consequently, a residuary beneficiary's inter-
est, for purposes of Section 2518, is regarded as an interest in severable prop-
erty. It is only when disclaimers are attempted to be made in trusts that the
requirements of the private letter ruling explained in the above paragraph are
applicable because at that point the IRS regards principal and income as
different interests and one has to disclaim all of one, or a portion of one, in a
manner that qualifies the disclaimer as an undivided portion of an interest.
Acceptance.
In Private Letter Ruling 8405003, the IRS held unqualified the attempted
disclaimer by a widow of assets bequeathed to her from her husband. The
executor had written estate checks covering a number of the widow's
expenses the effect of which were interest-free loans from the estate to the
widow. The "loans" were ultimately repaid. The Ruling held that the enjoy-
ment by the widow of the estate's money, interest free, for a nine month
period was a benefit and constituted acceptance of the property attempted to
be disclaimed. The Ruling rejected the estate's position that the widow was a
"debtor" rather than a beneficiary. Had the money actually been loaned to
the widow, who had then paid her own expenses, perhaps the argument
might have succeeded, althouth that too is questionable. Finally the Ruling
concluded that a person who disclaims has no interest in the disclaimed
property and, therefore, it would clearly be a breach of fiduciary duty for the
estate's executor to make disbursements for the benefit of a person not an
estate beneficiary.
Disclaimers in Post Mortem Planning.
A voiding "stacking."
A common goal of disclaimer is to avoid "estate stacking" in a "second"
estate-e.g., the estate of a surviving spouse or where an intended beneficiary
under a will has inherited substantial property in the period following the
drawing of the will and desires to disclaim or reduce taxes in his or her estate.
Income tax savings.
Disclaimers can also be useful in saving income taxes on income which
would be generated in the future by the disclaimed property, where the dis-
claimant is in a high income tax bracket and the takers of the property by
reason of the disclaimer are in low brackets. Private Letter Ruling 7830022
states that no triggering of income in respect of a decedent occurs upon dis-
claimer of right to such income. A disclaimer could also be useful where
substantial capital gains attributable to an asset have been incurred since
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death, and it is desired to spread those gains among several beneficiaries
either by distributing these gains to those beneficiaries on whose behalf they
have been incurred (such as gains on specifically devised real property), or by
making distributions from the estate to carry out distributable net income,
which (in addition to carrying out ordinary income) could be structured in
that particular year to contain such capital gains. Regulation § 1.643(a)-3(a).
Disclaimers and The Marital Deduction.
Disclaimers are extremely helpful in qualifying an otherwise unqualified
trust for QTIP election, in reducing the marital deduction where there is an
overqualification, and in increasing the marital deduction where there is an
underqualification. Recent private letter rulings provide helpful factual back-
grounds in evaluating the utility of disclaimer for marital deduction purposes.
1. Disclaimers to create a marital deduction qualification of a "family"
or "nonmarital" trust.
Private Letter Ruling 8331066 disallowed the marital deduction for a
sprinkling trust which benefited spouse and children. The children disclaimed
their rights to receive .income and principal from the trust during the spouse's
life and directed that the spouse receive all the trust's income, but they did
not disclaim their right to receive the trust's remainder on the spouse's death.
The ruling concluded that the children's disclaimers were not "qualified"
because (a) the disclaimers were for the spouse's lifetime and, therefore, did
not qualify as partial disclaimers because they did not relate to an undivided
portion of the decedent's property as expressed as a fraction or percentage of
each interest, and (2) they did not disclaim their rights to receive the
remainder interests, which the IRS interpreted to mean that they could enjoy
benefits from the disclaimed property. In addition, the children's direction
that the spouse would receive all of the income following their disclaimers
clearly would be a proscribed direction with respect to the disposition of the
disclaimed property, another factor disqualifying the disclaimers.
Private Letter Ruling 8337069 involved a testamentary trust drawn after
1982, but which contained two "problematical" provisions. One provided
that all accrued but unpaid income would be paid to the remaindermen, not
to the spouse's estate. The second provided that a daughter was a possible
principal beneficiary during the spouse's life. The remaindermen (including
grandchildren through the actions of a guardian) disclaimed their interests in
any of the accrued but unpaid income (presumably under the state's disclaim-
er laws such disclaimed property would pass to the surviving spouse's estate)
and the daughter also disclaimed her rights to receive principal during the
spouse's life. The daughter did not disclaim her right to receive the remainder
of the trust at the spouse's death. Contrary to the conclusion reached in the
Private Letter Ruling discussed in the above paragraph, here the IRS con-
cluded that the disclaimer was qualified and that the daughter did not need to
disclaim her remainder interest at the spouse's death because the remaining
trust property was deemed to have passed to her from the surviving
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spouse and not the decedent. Since the daughter disclaimed all interests in
property passing from the decedent, she did not have to disclaim at that same
time an interest which she would receive at the spouse's death and which was
deemed to pass from that spouse. The ruling cited the addition of subsection
(c) to Section 2044 made by the Technical Corrections Act of 1982 to the
effect that the property taxed in the surviving spouse's estate under Section
2044 is deemed to "pass" from that spouse for purposes, among other things,
of a new income tax basis.
Private Letter Ruling 8429085 allowed a marital deduction for QTIP
property where children were mistakenly given rights to discretionary distri-
butions of principal during the spouse's life. The children disclaimed both
rights to receive principal during the spouse's life and their remainder inter-
ests. Presumably they would not have had to disclaim the latter, on the the-
ory of Private Letter Ruling 8337069. The children were trustees for the
spouse but their powers of distribution were limited by ascertainable stand-
ards. Hence the ruling held that these rights as trustees did not amount to a
right to direct the disposition of the disclaimed property which would have
invalidated the disclaimer, and the trust qualified for QTIP treatment.
Private Letter Ruling 8309030 held that a residuary trust qualified for
QTIP treatment after the disclaimer by the surviving spouse of a lifetime
power of appointment and the rights to receive principal distributions. The
spouse had to disclaim the lifetime power in order to qualify it as a QTIP (no
lifetime powers of disposition may be held by anyone) and to meet the pro-
posed disclaimer regulations (Proposed Regulation § 25.2518-3(a)(1)) requir-
ing that any rights to receive principal must be disclaimed along with any
powers of appointment.
Assuming that the only problem with a trust was that the income of the
trust was not, by the trust's terms, payable -currently to the spouse, can the
trust be qualified as a QTIP disposition? For example, if children had been
named as possible beneficiaries along with the spouse of either income or
principal, and they had disclaimed all of their rights, the trust would be for
the sole benefit of the spouse during his or her life, but income would not be
currently payable. Could the trustee, through disclaimer of a power to
accumulate income, render it all payable to the spouse and thus qualify the
trust? Private Letter Ruling 8409024 held, in effect, no, because (a) the trus-
tee had no power under state law to disclaim the right to withhold income
during incompetency (this was the "bad" power rather than sprinkling) under
local law and (b) even if he did, such a power would not disappear with such
a disclaimer, but would have to be exercised by another fiduciary. Could the
trustee commit, either through an agreement with the spouse or otherwise, to
pay out all of the trust's income to the surviving spouse, thereby rendering the
trust qualified?
2. Disclaimers to increase an underqualified marital deduction.
In Private Letter Ruling 8347001, the IRS held that a qualified disclaimer
occurred, giving rise to an increased marital deduction, when two beneficiaries
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other than the spouse disclaiamed their interests in the decedent's residuary
estate. The residuary estate had been left equally to three people, including
the spouse, "share and share alike." The ruling concluded that a clear reading
of the provision resulted in all the property passing to the surviving spouse by
reason of the disclaimers and that there was no question about whether or
not the disclaimed property passed instead of the disclaimant under the intes-
tacy laws. There was no need under state law to determine anything further.
3. Disclaimers to reduce an overqualified marital deduction.
Private Letter Ruling 8240012 held invalid a disclaimer by a surviving
spouse (who received more property than could be deducted under the mari-
tal deduction) of $195,000 from the residuary estate. Since the dollar amount
disclaimed could be satisfied "in cash or in kind," the ruling stated that the
spouse" . . . has not identified the assets that he wishes to disclaim, and thus
the Executor of [the decedent's] estate (1) must choose which assets he
believes the [surviving spouse] disclaimed in order to fund the marital deduc-
tion for [the decedent's] estate and (2) must also choose assets which the
[surviving spouse] will accept as part of [the surviving spouse's] inheritance."
The ruling, in essence, holds that the property disclaimed is not severable
from the rest of the property because of the reasons stated.
Private Letter Ruling 8310893 approves a disclaimer by a surviving spouse
of a portion of the marital trust by way of a formula. The terms of the
formula provided that the surviving spouse would disclaim such amount of
the decedent's property as was in excess of that deductible under the applica-
ble marital deduction limitations.
4. Disclaimers to create a marital deduction by creating an intestacy.
If the surviving spouse and other persons were beneficiaries of a decdent's
will containing a trust which either would not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion in the first place, or would not qualify even after disclaimers by the other
beneficiaries (e.g., sprinkling or accumulation rather than direct payout of
income) if under local law the spouse could disclaim property passing under
the instrument, but still not be deemed to have predeceased for purposes of
the intestacy laws, the beneficiaries other than the spouse could disclaim both
their testate and intestate interests. If as a result of the disclaimer of testate
property by the spouse and all interests by the other beneficiaries, the prop-
erty passed outright to the surviving spouse under the intestacy laws, the
spouse's intestate interest would qualify for the unlimited marital deduction.
This presumes that disclaimers could be obtained for all of the beneficiaries
(even minors and possible unborn beneficiaries) and that there was no
"wipeout" clause which specified what disposition was to be made of the
property if all family members died. Several private letter rulings confirm this
planning possibility.
In Private Letter Ruling 8409089, each of three grandchildren disclaimed
"all but $75,000" of each grandchild's intestate share. The disclaimer meant
that the balance of the estate passed to the surviving spouse by intestacy and
qualified for the marital deduction. There were three grandchildren and
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$75,000 multiplied by three equals $225,000, the amount of the exemption
equivalent in the year the decedent died.
In Private Letter Ruling 8402121, the surviving spouse and all children
disclaimed their interest in a bypass trust which was to be funded by the
decedent's half of the community property. Those disclaimers resulted in an
intestacy, resulting in the passing of the property to the surviving spouse
outright, and hence qualified for the marital deduction.
In Private Letter Ruling 8439007, children and grandchildren disclaimed a
fractional interest in stock in excess of a sufficient number of shares to use up
the exemption equivalent. The ruling concluded that these disclaimers created
an intestacy and, as a result, the surviving spouse received the disclaimed
property which qualified for marital deduction.
IV. INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND DISTRIBUTIONS
FROM ESTATES.
Estates are separate taxpayers for income tax purposes, and an estate can
elect a fiscal year which is not shorter than 30 days nor longer than 12
months. Use of the estate as a separate income tax-paying entity obviously
produces another income taxpayer and reduces income taxes; selection of an
appropriate fiscal year can result in the substantial deferral of income taxes.
This is so because the beneficiary who receives a distribution from an estate
which carries out estate income is taxed on that income only in his calendar
year in which the estate's fiscal year ends. Hence a distribution by an estate in
March of a fiscal year that ends in January will not result in income taxation
to the recipient of the distribution until the calendar year following the year
of distribution.
Estates are generally taxed as complex trusts. Ordinarily income of an
estate in administration is not required to be currently distributed. Hence
both income and principal distributions of an estate fall into the "second
tier". I.R.C. §§ 661 and 662. Distributions to beneficiaries to the extent of
distributable net income will be deemed to consist proportionately of the
income of the estate.
The separate share rule does not apply to estates. Regulation § 1.663(c)-
3(f. The absence of the separate share rule can cause difficulties for the
executor of an estate since, for example, a distribution of property to one of
three equal estate residual beneficiaries of the estate will result in tax on all of
the estate's distributable net income equal to or less than the amount of the
distribution to that one beneficiary. Hence one beneficiary is taxed, and the
other beneficiaries not. However, if one of the beneficiaries is in a much
lower tax bracket than the other two beneficiaries, the absence of the separate
share rule could be useful in terms of making distributions of estate income to
the low bracket beneficiary, saving taxes for the high bracket beneficiaries.
Some equitable adjustment should probably be made in such a case so that
the lower bracket beneficiary will be reimbursed in part for his taxes. Dis-
proportionate distributions resulting in tax to only one beneficiary because of
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the absence of the separate share rule have been held to be valid notwith-
standing claims of unconstitutionality. See Harkness v. United States, 469
F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
One advantage of an estate, as opposed to a revocable trust with post
death provisions, is that income taxes may be paid in quarterly installments.
Distributions can also be made from estates to trusts, rather than individual
beneficiaries, which have the effect of carrying out estate income. These are
known as "trapping" distributions. They are distributions of principal which
have the effect of carrying out estate income to the trust under IRC Sections
661 and 662. Whether the income is further carried out to individual trust
beneficiaries depends upon whether the trust is simple or complex and
whether income or principal is distributed. For more information, the article
by Dave Cornfeld entitled "Trapping Distribution" contained in the 14th
Miami Institute on Estate Planning at 1400 for 1980 should be consulted.
Some case law has required that estate income must reimburse the trust's
principal for the amount of the additional income tax payable by the trust
which is attributable to the distribution. In re Estate of Holloway, 67 Misc. 2d
32, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 534 (Surr. Ct. 1971), modified 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327
N.Y.S. 2d 865 (Surr. Ct. 1972). The theory is that income taxes which
would, and should, have been borne by the income beneficiaries of an estate
have instead been borne by principal, even though there is an overall income
tax saving. These adjustments have become especially relevant after the 1981
tax legislation and the advent of the QTIP trust, since in most cases the
surviving spouse will have no power of appointment and certainly will not
have a general power of appointment. In many cases the QTIP trust's
remaindermen will be different from the spouse's own beneficiaries, and any
reduction of trust principal by reason of benefits enjoyed by the income
account should be addressed.
If the income interest of the QTIP is required to make a Holloway equita-
ble adjustment, the trust should not be deemed to have violated the QTIP
income payment requirement to the spouse. If the equitable adjustment is
required by state law then all the income as defined by state law would still
be deemed payable to the spouse, even though it is reduced by that equitable
adjustment.
There is a limited exclusion from that rule that distributions to estate bene-
ficiaries carry out estate income. This exclusion relates to certain bequests of
principal and is provided for by § 663(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
To qualify for the exception, the bequest must be of a specific sum or of
specific property and must be payable in not more than three installments.
The exclusion applies to trusts as well as to estates and has been narrowly
construed by the Internal Revenue Service; thus a marital deduction formula
clause based upon a fraction of the adjusted gross estate does not qualify for
the exception. Regulation § 1.663(a)-i(b)(1). The bequest of such number of
shares of stock as has a specified dollar value at the date of distribution does
not qualify for the exceptions since the exact number of shares is undetermined
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at death. Revenue Ruling 72-295, 1972-1 C.B. 197.
In Revenue Ruling 82-4, 1982-2 C.B. 99, the distribution by an executor
of the entire residuary estate to one of two children (because the date of
distribution value of the estate was less than the value of distributions made
to another child during life) was held to be a distribution in satisfaction of a
stated dollar amount, and since the property distributed was appreciated, gain
was recognized. The Will contained an equalization clause stating that the
amounts given to a child during life should be credited against his or her
share. A Section 661 deduction was disallowed.
When real property which forms the part of a residuary estate is distrib-
uted, such a distribution does not carry out distributable net income on the
theory that title to such realty vests in the residuary beneficiary on death.
Revenue Ruling 68-49, 1968-1 C.B. 304; Private Letter Ruling 8147023.
V. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY IN KIND.
There are special rules with respect to the tax consequence of distributions
from estates and trusts of property in kind in satisfaction of a pecuniary
legacy or other specific sum of money.
The 1984 Act amended I.R.C. § 643 by adding a new subsection (d)
which provides that if a fiduciary of an estate or a trust makes a distribution
of appreciated property to an estate or trust beneficiary, the beneficiary takes
over the trust or estate's cost basis for purposes of future capital gain recogni-
tion, and, to the extent that the distribution carries out income from the estate
or trust under I.R.C. §§661(a)(2) and 662(a)(2), the lesser of the property's
basis or fair market value is deemed to be carried out by the distribution.
However, if the fiduciary elects to recognize a gain or loss by reason of the
distribution to the beneficiary, then the amount deemed carried out to the
beneficiary will be the property's fair market value, as under current law.
Distributions described in I.R.C. § 663(a) (payment of specific bequests or
amounts in no more than three installments) are not affected by this section.
This new provision eliminates a significant planning opportunity which
many fiduciaries and their advisors had used. Distributions of appreciated
property would be made to estate and trust beneficiaries with the result that
the distribution carried out the estate's or trust's distributable net income in
the amount of the fair market value of the property distriabuted. The benefi-
ciary would then be taxed on that carried out income in his individual
income tax return, and the property would receive a new cost basis up to the
amount of distributable net income carried out to the beneficiary by the
distribution.
The new provision is made applicable to distributions after June 1, 1984,
in taxable years ending after such date.
An election by the fiduciary to treat such a distribution of appreciated
property as a sale or exchange resulting in capital gain would increase the tax
payable by the trust or estate, and would also increase the tax paid by the
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beneficiary, at least to the extent that the distribution carried out distributable
net income. However, that increase in tax to the beneficiary would reduce the
amount of income that otherwise would be taxed to the estate or trust. It
would appear that in most cases the election would not be made so that there
would be no capital gain at the estate or trust level, and only distributable net
income in the amount of the asset's basis would be carried out to the benefi-
ciary, leaving the beneficiary to recognize a capital gain when and if the
beneficiary disposed of the asset.
The obvious effect of the new legislation is to eliminate what many had
considered to be a "loophole" in allowing the unrealized appreciation assets
distributed to beneficiaries of estates or trusts, which distribution in turn car-
ried out income to them, to escape any capital gains taxation.
